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Executive Summary
The focus of this thesis is to provide input for choosing the optimal X-mas Tree (XT) configura-
tion for a subsea production system.
The subsea XT is used to direct, regulate, and stop the flow from a well. These functions and
some more are achieved through several valves, a subsea control module, and some sensors.
The choke valve has the worst inherent reliability of the components on a XT. Because of this
the choke valve is designed for easy retrieval. The choke valve could also be placed in a separate
flow control module. The subsea control module is the XT component with the second worst
reliability. Both these components are modules because it is good method of improving system
maintenance of unreliable components.
The main XT configurations are the vertical XT, the horizontal XT, and the deepwater vertical
XT. The main differences are how the main valves are placed and how the tubing with tubing
hanger is installed.
In subsea reliability it is common to use mean time to failure as a performance indicator and
the exponential distribution to model lifetimes.
A Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) analysis is frequently used to analyze
the subsea production system. RAM analysis software use reliability block diagrams, flow dia-
grams, and Monte Carlos next event simulation to simulate the lifetime and the availability of
the subsea production system.
Two main sources of reliability data for subsea components are OREDA (2009) and Molnes
and Strand (2007). When applying component reliability data in a RAM analysis, this often give
a lower availability than experienced in real life. This could relate to how, from when, or from
where the data are collected. Expert judgment can be used to calibrate the data so that the
model fit the real life scenario. The sensitivity and uncertainty of assumptions and the analysis
should also be considered. The model and analysis can then be used to optimize the reliability
of the design.
In OREDA (2009) the vertical XT has a lower inherent reliability than the horizontal XT. The
low reliability may relate to the large share of older generation vertical XTs installed. Under-
standing the quality of the data is difficult and decisions should not be taken solely on the basis
vof unprocessed data.
A key difference between the XT configurations is the maintainability of the tree and the tub-
ing. Wells that are expected to have many tubing failures should be equipped with a horizontal
XT and a vertical XT should be on a well with few tubing failures. This is mainly due to the or-
der of which the components are installed as the HXT allows the tubing to be retrieved without
retrieving the tree and vice versa for the VXT.
A failure on the wellhead connector will have a large impact on the availability. Interventions
on the horizontal XT are done with a blowout preventer. The height of both these components
puts more strain on the wellhead than the other XT configurations. Tripping out tubing is one
of the more dangerous operations in a well; this combined with the extra strain on the wellhead
may cause bad consequences. This may give an advantage for the VXT in a risk perspective.
A horizontal XT with a flow control module will have improved maintainability, but this adds
potential leak paths and makes the design more complex. The vertical XT and deepwater vertical
XT are easier to retrieve and may be better off with a simpler design without the flow control
module.
The deepwater vertical XT is easier to maintain than a vertical XT. It may be a good choice
of configuration for wells with a medium amount of tubing failures. The DVXT is more com-
plex and has more leak paths than the other two configurations and may have a higher infant
mortality because of this.
OneSubsea (2015) help their customers choose XT configuration with a tree selector tool.
Ranking the importance of different aspects give an output of how the XT configurations fit this
ranking. This gives a good indication of which configuration to choose for a well.
CAPEX and OPEX are important factors in the decision process.
A RAM analysis would give an overall look on the reliability and life cycle cost of the subsea
production system. RAM analysis software is able to process the many varying factors that im-
pact the optimal XT configuration for a subsea production system and should be the foundation
of the decision process.
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Sammendrag
Fokus for denne masteroppgaven er å optimalisere valg av juletre konfigurasjon for et under-
vanns petroleums produksjons system.
Et undervanns juletre leder, regulerer og kan stoppe en brønn. Disse funksjonene og noen
til gjøres a flere ventiler, en kontroll modul og noen sensorer.
På et juletre er strupeventilen komponenten med dårligst pålitelighet. Derfor er den de-
signet for og lett kunne bli erstattet. Strupeventilen kan også bli plassert i en egen flyt kontroll
modul. Undervanns kontroll modulen er juletre komponenten med nest dårligst pålitelighet.
Plassering av upålitelige komponenter i moduler er en god metode å forenkle vedlikehold.
De tre konfigurasjonene av juletrær er vertikale, horisontale og dypvanns vertikale juletrær.
Hovedforskjellen er hvordan ventilene er plassert og hvordan tubing og tubing hengeren er in-
stallert.
I pålitelighet på undervanns komponenter er den vanligste ytelsesindikatoren gjennomsnit-
tlig tid til feil (Mean Time To Failure) og den vanligste livstid modellen er eksponential fordelin-
gen.
En pålitelighet, tilgjengelighet og vedlikeholdsvennlighet (RAM) analyse er en vanlig måte å
analysere et undervanns produksjons system. En RAM analyse bruker pålitelighets blokk dia-
gram, flyt diagram og Monte Carlo neste hendelse simulering for å simulere livsløpet og tilgjen-
geligheten til et undervanns produksjons system.
To kilder til pålitelighets data for undervanns komponenter er OREDA (2009) og Molnes and
Strand (2007). Når komponent pålitelighetsdata blir brukt i en RAM analyse kan det gi en lavere
systemtilgjengelighet enn i virkeligheten. Dette kan stamme fra hvordan, fra når og fra hvor
dataen er innhentet. Ekspertvurderinger kan bruker til å kalibrere dataen sånn at modellen
blir mer lik virkeligheten. Usikkerheten og sensitiviteten til antagelsene burde være vurdert.
Modellen og analysen kan så brukes til å optimere påliteligheten til et design.
Det vertikale treet har i OREDA (2009) en lavere pålitelighet enn det horisontale treet. Den
lavere påliteligheten kan stamme fra den store andelen av eldre vertikale trær som er installert.
En god forståelse av kvaliteten av dataen er vanskelig, derfor burde beslutninger ikke tas bare på
grunnlag av slik data.
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En viktig forskjell på juletre konfigurasjonene er hvor vedlikeholds vennlig treet og tubingen
er. Brønner som forventes å ha mange tubing feil burde ha horisontalt trær og vertikale trær
burde være på brønner som forventer få tubing feil. Dette kommer fra rekkefølgen tubing og tre
blir installert i siden det horisontale treet tillater at tubingen kan trekkes uten at treet trekker og
motsatt for vertikale trær.
En skade på brønnhodekoblingen vil ha en stor påvirkning på tilgjengeligheten. Interven-
sjoner på horisontale trær gjennomføres med en utblåsningsventil på toppen av treet. Høyden
av disse komponentene utgjør større krefter på brønnhodet enn hos de andre juletre konfig-
urasjonene. Utkjøring av tubing er en av de farligste aksjonene i en brønn; dette kombinert
med ekstra krefter på brønnhodet kan føre til dårlige konsekvenser. Dette kan gi en fordel til det
vertikale treet i et risiko perspektiv.
Et horisontalt tre med en flyt kontroll modul vil ha en forbedret vedlikeholds vennlighet,
men modulen gir flere potensielle lekkasjeveier og gjør designet mer komplekst. Det vertikale
og dypvanns vertikale treet er lettere å ta opp for vedlikehold og kan være bedre tjent med et
enklere design uten flyt kontroll modulen.
Dypvannstreet er enklere å vedlikeholde enn det vertikale. Det kan være et godt valg av kon-
figurasjon for brønner med et medium antall tubingfeil. Dypvannstreet har et mer kompleks
design med flere lekasjeveier enn de andre to konfigurasjonene og kan ha en høyere initiell feil-
rate på grunn av dette.
OneSubsea (2015) hjelper kundene sine med å velge juletre konfigurasjon med et eget verk-
tøy. Rangering av viktigheten til forskjellige aspekter gir et resultat med hvordan hver av de tre
konfigurasjonene passer til denne rangeringen. Dette gir en god indikasjon for hvilket valg som
er best for brønnen.
Innvesterings og operasjonskostnader er viktige faktorer i valget av konfigurasjon.
En RAM analyse vil gi et overblikk på påliteligheten og livstidskostnadene til et undervanns
produksjons system. En data RAM analyse kan prosessere de mange variablene som påvirker
den optimale juletre konfigurasjonen for et undervanns produksjons system og burde være
grunnlaget i en beslutningsprosess.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The number of subsea production systems has increased a lot since 1990 (Bai and Bai, 2012).
"The market will see orders for over 3,000 new subsea trees through 2017 (>60% growth from 2008-
2012). Deep and ultra deepwater subsea demand is expected to increase by 90% through 2017
compared to the previous five years" (Quest Offshore, 2013).
Oil and gas development is also being explored in the arctic. Due to ice and icebergs, subsea
production systems are the only viable methods in some areas. This would require very reliable
and safe systems due to the inaccessibility during the winter, both for maintenance and miti-
gation of a potential blowout. The arctic ecosystem is fragile and an oil spill could have a large
impact. Safe and reliable subsea production systems will therefore become more and more im-
portant.
The Åsgard subsea field on the Norwegian Continental Shelf has a lifetime of 20 years, some
parts up to 40 years. The equipment is therefore designed for 20 years or 30 years (Østebø et al.,
2001).
For a subsea oil and gas field repair and intervention are expensive due to unavailability of
the production and mobilization times for vessels. Therefore the lost production and interven-
tion costs are a big part of the life cycle cost of a subsea well (Brandt and Eriksen, 2001).
The subsea X-mas Tree (XT) is an essential part of a subsea production system. There are
lots of possible configurations and equipment provided from different suppliers. The XT comes
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in different variants and often requires detailed engineering for each project. With the decrease
in the oil price the last year there is an increased demand for standardized solutions.
The main companies supplying subsea XTs are FMC Technologies, Aker Solutions, OneSub-
sea, and GE Oil & Gas, market share in that order (Quest Offshore, 2013). Oil producing com-
panies come to the suppliers with an increased focus on reliability and standardized products.
Therefore it is important to both the oil companies and the suppliers to have a good under-
standing of the XT configurations and what the best solution for a specific field is.
The overall reliability of XTs is mostly not a big problem; the interesting part is the difference
in reliability between the main configurations of XTs which is the focus of this master thesis.
In this thesis there are two main sources of information on XTs that overlap to some extent.
Most references are made to Bai and Bai (2012) because this is the most recent. Similar informa-
tion can also be found in Richbourg and Winter (1998). Golan and Sangesland (1993) is a third
even older source has also provided some useful information on the XT.
Previously a master thesis has addressed the reliability of the deepwater vertical XT from GE
Oil & Gas (Stendebakken, 2014). The thesis focus on a single tree and its retrieval rate, this thesis
has been used as a source for reliability data and description the deepwater vertical XT from GE.
The main source on the topic reliability is Rausand and Høyland (2004). Reliability data are
taken from OREDA (2009) and Molnes and Strand (2007). Terminology definitions are often
taken from the vocabulary database IEV Online (2015).
1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this Master’s thesis are:
1. Carry out and document a literature survey related to subsea x-mas trees.
2. Describe the main functions of a subsea x-mas tree and the reliability of its main compo-
nents.
3. Describe the differences between the main subsea x-mas tree configurations and how
these affect the reliability of the subsea production system.
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4. Evaluate the reliability data and models that are used to assess the reliability of subsea
x-mas trees.
5. Carry out and document a reliability assessment with focus on the differences between
the main subsea x-mas tree configurations.
6. Describe and evaluate what should be assessed when selecting a x-mas tree configuration
for a new subsea well.
1.3 Limitations
In this report only wet subsea x-mas trees are discussed. Any reference to x-mas trees or the
acronym XT refers to subsea x-mas trees.
The variations of a subsea production field and XTs are endless; it will be difficult to consider
every variation in detail. In this thesis there is a broad focus on XTs for both oil and gas produc-
tion. Injection trees are mostly disregarded. Broader concepts of the XT are discussed rather
than the detailed engineering. Water depth, temperature, pressure, and bore size are only con-
sidered in a broad context.
"Subsea wells can be classified as either satellite wells or clustered wells" (Bai and Bai, 2012).
Satellite wells are more independent than clustered wells that share more functions. This thesis
only considers the clustered wells; however, the difference in small. Clustered wells can be put
on a common template but also this is not considered.
There is limited literature on XT reliability available. This is due to the competition that exists
between the XT suppliers. The XT is also one of the safer and field proven parts of the subsea
production system. This has limited the open research available on XT reliability.
1.4 Approach
Objective 1, 2, and 3 is achieved through a literature survey on XTs. Objective 4 is achieved
through a literature survey on the quality and collection of reliability data.
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A qualitative reliability system analysis is conducted to achieve objective 5. Objective 6 is
achieved partially through the reliability analysis and partially through a literature survey.
1.5 Structure of the Report
The rest of the report is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to a x-mas tree’s functions, components, component relia-
bility, and the main configurations.
Chapter 3 introduces reliability and reliability analysis.
In Chapter 4 a qualitative reliability analysis of the x-mas tree configurations is conducted.
Chapter 5 highlights other aspects than reliability that should be taken into consideration
when selecting a x-mas tree configuration.
In Chapter 6 an evaluation of the reliability analysis is conducted.
Summary and recommendations for further work are in Chapter 7.
Acronyms are in Appendix A. Some definitions from the subsea production system are pro-
vided in Appendix B to help the reader understand the terminology.
Chapter 2
X-Mas Tree Function, Components, and
Configurations
Understanding the functions of a XT is an important start for a reliability assessment. This chap-
ter introduces the functions of a XT, what is used to achieve these functions, and the different
configurations available. A literature study is conducted to achieve this goal.
The name XT originates from XTs on platforms or onshore. The valves were stacked on top of
each other and were painted green. This resembled a Christmas tree and thus was named after
its appearance. For subsea application the XT has many of the same functions, but are more
complex and painted yellow.
2.1 Functions of a X-Mas Tree
Bai and Bai (2012) state that the typical functional requirements of a subsea XT are:
1. Direct the produced fluids from the well to the flowline (called production tree) or to
canalize the injection of water or gas into the formation (called injection tree).
2. Regulate the fluid flow through a choke (not always required).
3. Monitor well parameters at the level of the tree, such as well pressure, annulus pressure,
temperature, sand detection, etc.
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4. Safely stop the flow of fluid produced or injected by means of valves actuated by a control
system.
5. Inject into the well or the flowline protection fluids, such as inhibitors for corrosion or
hydrate prevention.
NORSOK D-010 (2013) state similar functions but has one more function that is important:
6. Provide vertical tool access through the swab valve(s) for vertical trees or through crown
plug(s) for horizontal trees.
NORSOK D-010 also has another function embedded in point number three. Not only should
the annulus pressure be monitored, but also pressure adjustment of the annulus should be pro-
vided if necessary.
Point number five is not always implemented because it depends on the properties of the
produced gas or oil.
2.1.1 Functional Analysis
Structured analysis and design techniques are used to model function blocks. Several blocks
can be linked together and form a functional block diagram (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). This
is a useful tool for breaking down the functions and understanding a system.
Integration Definition 0 (IDEF0) is based on and further developed from the structured anal-
ysis and design technique. "For existing systems, IDEF0 can be used to analyze the functions that
the system performs and to record the means by which these are done" ISO 31320-1 (2012).
Functions are represented by boxes and with several arrows pointing in and out. There are
four categories that each is represented on one of the four sides of the box, see Figure 2.1. Each
box has a box name that in the example is X. The four categories are (ISO 31320-1):
Control a condition or set of conditions required for a function to produce correct output.
Output that which is produced by a function
Mechanism the means used by a function to transform input into output.
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Function
Control
Output
Mechanism
Input
X
Figure 2.1: IDEF0 functional block (derived from ISO 31320-1)
Input that which is transformed by a function into output.
Three IDEF0 functional block diagrams have been made for the functions of a XT, see Fig-
ures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. The box name is equivalent to the function number from the previous
mentioned functional requirements.
Function five is not represented in a figure because of this an optional function depending
on the conditions of the flow from the well.
It is important to note that an IDEF0 diagram illustrates the function flow, not the actual flow.
In Figure 2.2 the flow from the well comes into the XT and passes through the PMV and then the
PWV, see Figures 2.6 and 2.7. The choke valve is located right after the PWV and then the flow
goes into a connector with the jumper that goes towards the manifold. The two functions to
stop and regulate flow are put in parallel because of their independent functions. The function
to direct the flow through the valves is, however, necessary to fulfill the other two.
Each function described has one or more functional requirements. Figure 2.2 has a function
to stop flow on demand. A functional requirement could be how fast this is done and the leakage
rate after closure. Other function requirements can be how much pressure the valve can contain.
How well the XT fulfills these function requirements affects the performance of the function and
thus the reliability.
The IDEF0 diagrams are a good foundation for a structured view on the functions, this can
be used as boundaries when a XT is analyzed.
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Direct flow from
well through valves
and into jumper
XT design
Flow into jumper
Production bore
Connectors
1
Flow from well
Stop flow on demand
Topside control
Flow that can be
stopped on demand
PMV and PWV
4
Hydraulic power
Regulate flow
Topside control
Regulated flow
Choke valve
2
Hydraulic power
Figure 2.2: IDEF0 functional block diagram of XT functions 1, 2, and 4, see Section 2.1.
Monitor annulus Annulus pressure data
Sensors in XT
Annulus pressure
3-A
Pressure adjust-
ment of annulus
Topside control
Pressure
adjusted
annulus
ACV and AMV
3-B
Hydraulic power
Figure 2.3: IDEF0 functional block diagram of XT function 3, see Section 2.1.
Provide access
to the well
Light intervention
Well access
Swab valve or
crown plug
6
Hydraulic power
or wireline
Figure 2.4: IDEF0 functional block of XT function 6, see Section 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Main XT component reliability from the SubseaMaster database (taken from Molnes
and Strand, 2007)
Item: Service time
(item years):
No. of
failures:
MTTF (years):
Choke valve 224,2 18 14,9
Connector (Control/ flow line) 492,4 0 >492,3
Connector (Tree cap) 98,4 0 >98,4
Connector (XT) 552,0 0 >552,0
Piping 5546,3 6 924,4
Pressure compensation system 199,1 1 199,1
Sensor/ indicator 1018,2 7 169,7
Subsea control module 228,0 9 45,6
Valve w/actuator 5396,5 33 168,6
Wellhead 543,1 1 >543,1
XT plug 451,5 2 225,8
2.2 Main Components of a X-Mas Tree
The main components of a XT are described in the following sections. The reliability of a com-
ponent can partially be described with Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), see Section 3.1 for more
information on reliability measures. Table 2.1 shows the main components of a XT and their
MTTF. The number of failures includes both installation (within 6 days) and in-service failures.
The MTTF is calculated from only the in-service failures. This is why there is a disparity between
the service time, number of failures, and the calculated MTTF.
2.2.1 Production Valves
Regulating and stopping flow from a well are accomplished by several valves that make up the
XT. Two examples of how the valves are placed are shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
The most important valve is the Production Master Valve (PMV). This is a part of the sec-
ondary well barrier and essential for the well’s integrity. The PMV is the main valve responsible
for stopping the flow from the well on demand in Figure 2.2, function 4.
The Production Wing Valve (PWV) is placed after the PMV and serves as a redundancy of the
PMV. When the tree valves are required to stop the flow, the PWV is often closed first to allow the
PMV to be closed without flow to reduce wear. The PWV also allow isolation from the flowline
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during vertical entry into a XT (Golan and Sangesland, 1993).
In Bai and Bai (2012) the PWV is named PMV2, this may cause some confusion therefore
PMV and PWV are used in this thesis.
As seen in Table 2.1 the MTTF of the valves on a XT is 168,6 years. This is one of the more
accurate MTTFs because of the large amount of service time recorded.
2.2.2 Choke Valve
The choke valve regulates the flow from the well; it is responsible for function 2 in Figure 2.2. It
is normally placed on the XT after the PWV, but can also be placed on a manifold. In this report
the choke valve is treated as a part of the XT.
The choke valve is exposed to wear due to erosion, and may require more frequent main-
tenance or replacement than the rest of the XT. The choke valve has the lowest MTTF of the
components listed in Table 2.1. This is why the choke valve should be easy to retrieve (Golan
and Sangesland, 1993). This is achieved by having a choke insert that allow for easy retrieval of
the worn parts of the valve. This allows the choke valve to be replaced without pulling the XT.
A producing well may be required to be changed to an injection well (or vice versa) during
the lifetime of an oil field. This can be achieved through some initial design adaptations on the
XT and later changing the choke valve.
2.2.3 Other Valves
The annulus master valve and annulus workover valve "are used to equalize the pressure between
the upper space and lower space of the tubing hanger during normal production" (Bai and Bai,
2012).
An annulus crossover valve is optional. It allows communication between the annulus and
production bores. This "can be used to allow fluid passage for well kill operations or to overcome
obstructions caused by hydrate formation" (Bai and Bai, 2012).
The swab valve on the vertical x-mas tree and the crown plug on the horizontal x-mas tree
allow intervention into the well with wireline or coiled tubing.
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2.2.4 Subsea Control Module
The Subsea Control Module (SCM) is an important part of the overall reliability of XT. It provides
actuation and monitoring of most of the XT’s functions. "The typical SCM receives electrical
power, communication signals, and hydraulic power supplies from surface control equipment"
(Bai and Bai, 2012).
The reliability is one of the lowest of the XT components (see Table 2.1). The control mod-
ule has several redundant systems incorporated into it. Despite of this the complex electronic
equipment make the SCM unreliable. The low reliability of the SCM is countered with the mod-
ule being an independently retrievable unit.
Jardine (1986) states that modularization of equipment "is a well known mean of improving
system maintenance". Modularization offers the following benefits (Jardine, 1986):
• Reduction in the actual repair time of failed equipment via quick release modular connec-
tions and better access.
• Reduction in the number of different subsea tasks to be carried out.
• Reduction in the number of different types of spares required for system upkeep.
The module also simplifies the design phase because the module is the same on any XT, no
matter the configuration or size. The content of the SCM will be different, but the connector,
guiding, and size will be the same.
2.2.5 Connectors
The connection between the XT and the wellhead is typically done with a hydraulic connector.
This is a modified BOP connector that has been specialized for subsea application (Bai and Bai,
2012). Table 2.1 shows that the reliability of the connectors is not recorded as a problem. The
critical phase of the connector is during connection. Failures will be discovered quickly due to
function and pressure testing before the well is put into service.
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2.2.6 Sensors
To fulfill function 3-A (see Figure 2.3) the XT need various sensors. Bai and Bai (2012) state
that the sensors used in a XT are pressure and temperature sensors, placed in the annulus and
production bore and upstream and downstream of the choke.
Golan and Sangesland (1993) state that the sensors generally in a tree are pressure, temper-
ature, sand erosion, valve position, and hydrocarbon leak detection sensors.
Some customers also require that the flow from the well is monitored with a flow meter.
Either a wet gas flow meter or multiphase flow meter depending on the type of well.
The different sensors available for a XT relate to different types of well, fields and oil com-
panies with different specifications. What kind of sensors installed on a XT is therefore tailored
every time.
Some sensors may be required to be changed during the lifetime of the well. Sensors may be
worn out or the conditions of the well may change so much that a well parameter goes beyond
the range of the sensor. As seen in Table 2.1, the MTTF of sensors and indicators a relatively
high. The changing parameters of a well may be a more frequent reason of sensor replacement
than failures.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, a production well may be changed to an injection well. This
will also require changing some sensors. This can be solved with placing some sensors and the
choke valve into a retrievable Flow Control Module (FCM). The term FCM is used by GE Oil &
Gas and in this thesis, OneSubsea use the term retrievable process module. A retrievable FCM
has some other benefits as well, such as lower weight of the XT that can be beneficial for rig cost
during installation. However, the main reason for a FCM is improving system maintenance as
previous stated in Section 2.2.4.
For the Åsgard field the minimum lifetime is 20 or 30 years, here the choke valve and multi-
phase flow meter are put into a FCM. The FCM can be replaced with a monohull vessel in less
than 48 hours (Østebø et al., 2001) which can save a lot of time in rig cost and mobilization time.
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2.3 The Main X-Mas Tree Configurations
The oil companies have different technical requirements that result in adaptations on the XT to
the specific buyer. Also the oil fields require different functions on the XT. This has resulted in a
wide array of XTs installed around the world.
There are two main configurations of XTs. The conventional XT that is called a dual bore tree
or a Vertical X-mas Tree (VXT). The other main configuration is called a Horizontal X-mas Tree
(HXT).
GE Oil & Gas has developed a tree configuration they call the Deepwater Vertical X-mas Tree
(DVXT). The DVXT is not a conventional VXT; it is installed with a Tubing Head Spool (THS) that
incorporates some benefits from the HXT into the VXT. In this thesis the DVXT is treated as an
independent type of XT configuration in addition to the HXT and the VXT. Other XT suppliers
have similar configurations; OneSubsea call theirs a vertical monobore subsea tree.
2.3.1 Vertical X-Mas Tree
A VXT configuration is shown in Figure 2.6. The VXT is also called a conventional XT or a dual
bore XT. The main characteristic of the VXT is that the production and annulus bores run ver-
tically in the tree with the main valves oriented vertically in the main block of the tree (Bai and
Bai, 2012).
The well is completed and the tubing hanger hung in the wellhead before the VXT is installed.
Well completion is when the production tubing suspended in the tubing hanger is landed in the
wellhead or XT.
The VXT lands on top of the wellhead and tubing hanger. The orientation of the VXT is
important because of the asymmetric dual bore and the control lines for downhole equipment
on the tubing hanger (Bai and Bai, 2012).
A VXT is installed with an installation/workover dual-bore riser and a tree running tool. On
a live well a lower marine riser package is required, this functions the same way as a Blowout
Preventer (BOP) and is installed between the tree and the installation/workover riser (Richbourg
and Winter, 1998).
Bai and Bai (2012) state that a VXT is larger and heavier than a HXT. However, OneSubsea
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(2015) state that the VXT and HXT "typically have the same size, weight, and footprint when
comparing equivalent systems". The conflicting statements may suggest that there may be a
difference, but it is negligible when choosing between the configurations. The main driver of
the weight of the XT is not the configuration but the bore size and pressure rating.
2.3.2 Horizontal X-Mas Tree
A HXT configuration is shown in Figure 2.7. The valves on a HXT are located horizontally to the
sides.
The HXT is installed on top of the wellhead before the well is completed. The well is then
completed through the HXT and the tubing hanger is hung into the HXT. This allows the tubing
to be pulled without the need to pull the tree.
The tubing hanger is installed with casing tubular joint through a regular drilling BOP con-
nected to the HXT. However, this requires a complex landing string with valves that is special
made to the particular BOP used. This is because of the shear rams incapability of cutting cer-
tain parts of the landing string (Bai and Bai, 2012).
2.3.3 Deepwater Vertical X-Mas Tree
The DVXT differs from the VXT because of a THS that is installed on top of the wellhead before
the well is completed.
The THS is a combination of a tubing head and a completion guidebase.
ISO 13628-4 state that the uses of a tubing head are:
1. Provide a crossover between wellheads and subsea trees made by different equipment
manufacturers.
2. Provide a crossover between different sizes and/or pressure ratings of subsea wellheads
and trees.
3. Provide a surface for landing and sealing a tubing hanger if the wellhead is damaged or is
not designed to receive the hanger.
4. Provide means for attaching any guidance equipment to the subsea wellhead.
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Only number 4 use is valid for the THS but the others may also apply in certain cases.
ISO 13628-4 also state that the tubing hanger may be landed in the tubing head which is the
case on the DVXT configuration. Similar to a HXT the THS provides passive orientation of the
tubing hanger. The DVXT has a monobore tubing hanger. A bore in the THS with an annulus
isolation valve, bypasses the tubing hanger as seen in Figure 2.5, valve 16.
"A completion guidebase, may incorporate piping, flowline connections, and tree piping in-
terface hardware" (Richbourg and Winter, 1998). For the DVXT this means that the flowline
connection is not on the XT as usual. The THS supports a piping spool that connects to the
DVXT and to the jumper. This allows the jumper to be connected before the DVXT is installed
and remain connected if the DVXT is pulled.
The DVXT has a concentric dual-bore design; this means that a dual bore riser is not neces-
sary as with a VXT. A regular subsea BOP can be used together with a marine riser and a tubing
hanger running tool during intervention and installation.
The THS provides guidance with orientation fins that orients the DVXT when it is landing
onto the THS (GE Oil & Gas, 2012).
After the THS is installed onto the wellhead, the well is completed. The DVXT is then in-
stalled on top of the THS as a normal VXT. The connection to the THS consists of two connec-
tors, one with a regular wellhead connector that connects to the THS and tubing hanger. The
other is a smaller but similar connector as the wellhead connector, this connects to the flowline
connector spool on the THS.
The DVXT configuration is heavier than the VXT and HXT, but the weight is distributed be-
tween the two lifts of the THS and the tree. This can be beneficial if the XT weight is around the
crane capacity of the installation vessel. Because of the two main components, the DVXT takes
up more deck space on the installation vessel.
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Key 
1 CAP 13 tubing hanger 
2 ASV (manual or failed closed or optional plug) 14 tubing head 
3 PSV (manual or failed closed or optional plug) 15 wellhead 
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7 production 19 PSV 
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11 PMV 23 production line 
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NOTE The dotted inclusions are optional. A non-pressure-containing tree cap can be considered when two 
swab closures are included. 
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Figure 2.5: Example of a vertical tree on a tubing head (taken from ISO 13628-4).
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Figure 18 Subsea well with vertical X-mas tree (dual bore through X-mas tree and TH) 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Subsea well with VXT, dual bore through XT and TH (taken from Norwegian Oil &
Gas, 2012).
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Figure 19 Subsea well with horizontal X-mas tree 
 
The most significant differences between the vertical and horizontal tree are the position of 
the valves and tubing hanger. The X-mas tree is frequently selected out from both 
configurations. The advantage of the horizontal X-mas tree is that it has the ability to remove 
the tubing without removing the tree. So, if more frequent replacement of the production 
tubing is expected compared to the X-mas tree, a horizontal tree may be selected. Installation 
of a horizontal X-mas tree reduces the amount of equipment needed, time and cost. It also 
allows easier access for well intervention. A disadvantage is when the tree itself has to be 
removed. In this case, the upper completion (tubing hanger, tubing, DHSV, etc.) has to be 
retrieved which is a time consuming and costly operation. Additional disadvantages would be 
that interventions through the tubing are more difficult than a vertical tree since removing or 
Figure 2.7: Subsea well with HXT (taken from Norwegian Oil & Gas, 2012).
The main components that vary between VXT and HXT are as follows:
• Tree body: The tree body in a HXT is normally designed to be an
integrated spool. The PMV is located in this tree body, as well as the
annulus valves. The PWV is usually designed to be integrated into
a production wing block, which can be easily connected to the tree body
by flange methods. This design results in components that are inter-
changeable between the HXTs in the industry. In addition, the tubing
hanger system is located in the tree body.
• Tubing hanger system:AVXTutilizes a conventional tubing hanger, which
has a main production bore and an annulus bore. The tubing hanger is
located in the wellhead. However, in an HXT, the tubing hanger is
a monobore tubing hanger with a side outlet through which the
production flow will pass into the PWV. Because the TH in the HXT is
located in the tree body, it needs the crown plugs as the barrier method.
An internal tree cap is the second barrier located above the crown plug.
If dual crown plugs are designed in a TH system, an internal tree cap is
not used.
• Tree cap: The tree cap in a VXT system has the functions of providing
the control interfaces during workover and sealing the tree from
seawater ingress. An HXT, in contrast, has internal tree caps and tree
debris caps.
These differ nces are illustrated i Figure 22-23.
Figure 22-23 Differences between VXTs and HXTs (Courtesy of Vetco Gray)
738 Y. Bai and Q. Bai
Figure 2.8: XT block assembly, HXT to the left and VXT to the right (taken from Bai and Bai, 2012)

Chapter 3
Approaches to Reliability Assessment
Reliability can defined as the "ability to perform as required, without failure, for a given time
interval, under given conditions" (IEV Online, 2015).
A reliability assessment does not have a good definition compared to the definition of a risk
assessment. Risk assessment is defined as the "overall process comprising a risk analysis and a
risk evaluation" (IEV Online). This can be transferred to the description of a reliability assess-
ment in that an assessment consists of an analysis and an evaluation.
3.1 Measures of Reliability
Rausand and Høyland (2004) use four measures of reliability of non-repairable item. The relia-
bility function, failure rate function z(t), Mean Time To Failure (MTTF), and mean residual life.
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Fig. 2.4 Empirical bathtub curve. 
and hence 
A histogram depicting z ( i )  as a function of i typically is of the form given in Fig. 2.4. 
If YZ is very large, we may use very small time intervals. If we let A t  + 0, is it 
expected that the step function z ( i )  will tend toward a “smooth” curve, as illustrated 
in Fig. 2.5, which may be interpreted as an estimate for the failure rate function z ( r ) .  
This curve is usually called a bathtub curve after its characteristic shape. The 
failure rate is often high in the initial phase. This can be explained by the fact that 
there may be undiscovered defects (known as “infant mortality”) in the items; these 
soon show up when the items are activated. When the item has survived the infant 
mortality period, the failure rate often stabilizes at a level where it remains for a certain 
amount of time until it starts to increase as the items begin to wear out. From the 
shape of the bathtub curve, the lifetime of an item may be divided into three typical 
intervals: the burn-in period, the useful life period and the wear-out period. The 
useful life period is also called the chance failure period. Often the items are tested 
at the factory before they are distributed to the users, and thus much of the infant 
mortality will be removed before the items are delivered for use. For the majority 
of mechanical items the failure rate function will usually show a slightly increasing 
tendency in the useful life period. 
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0 Time t ’ 
Fig. 2.5 The bathtub curve. 
Figure 3.1: The bathtub curve (taken from Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
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The failure rate function and MTTF are the most used in subsea reliability engineering.
The exponential distribution is the most common probability distribution that is used to
model the lifetime of a non-repairable item. The exponential distribution has a constant failure
rate. Rausand and Høyland (2004) state that this distribution "may be a realistic life distribution
for an item during its useful life period". The useful life period is the flat middle part of the bath-
tub curve in Figure 3.1. This is a good assumption since most components will only be in this
part during the lifetime of the system. In addition "most of the commercially available reliability
data sources are based on the assumption of constant failure rates" Rausand and Høyland (2004).
Molnes and Strand (2007) state that SubseaMaster does not include failures within the first
six days after installation into the MTTF calculations. Brandt and Eriksen (2001) refers to this as
the "infant mortality" and are subsea components that sometimes fail shortly after installation
or an intervention. In Figure 3.1 the infant mortality is the same as the burn-in period. By
removing the infant mortality from the calculation of failure rate, the result is more accurate.
To cover the infant mortality in a reliability model, Brandt and Eriksen (2001) state that "an
installation failure probability can be applied".
With the exponential distribution the relationship between the failure rate (λ) and MTTF
is constant, as seen in Equation 3.1, taken from Rausand and Høyland (2004). MTTF is often
used when presenting reliability data because it is a more relatable number than the failure rate.
However, when using MTTF it is important to note that "MTTF is merely a performance indicator,
not a lifetime prediction figure" (Molnes and Sundet, 1993).
MT T F = 1
λ
(3.1)
3.2 Reliability System Analysis
Rausand and Høyland (2004) state that "the main reliability measure for a maintained item is
the availability". Availability is defined as the "ability to be in a state to perform as required" (IEV
Online). A more comprehensive definition is that "availability depends upon the combined char-
acteristics of the reliability, recoverability, maintainability, and the maintenance support perfor-
mance" (IEV Online). Rausand and Høyland (2004) mentions that the reliability incorporated
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under availability is the inherent reliability.
Recoverability and maintenance support performance are the same for the XT configura-
tions and are therefore not further discussed.
Maintainability is defined as the "ability to be retained in, or restored to a state to perform as
required, under given conditions of use and maintenance" (IEV Online).
From these definitions it can be derived that the system reliability is the overall systems abil-
ity to function and the inherent reliability is the ability of an items to function without failure.
A subsea XT is designed to last as long as possible without maintenance. Depending on the
type of XT, the maintainability of the tubing would change. This would affect the availability of
the well. So even when a XT is not considered a maintained system, availability is a key factor in
the system reliability of the well.
3.2.1 RAM Analysis
Calculating the availability of a system such as a subsea production well is very complex. Many
oil companies use Monte Carlo next event simulation data software to simulate the availability,
this is called a Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) analysis. Miriam RAM Studio
and Maros are commonly used software for this kind of RAM analyses.
Well intervention and subsea repair costs can be quantified through a RAM analysis. Com-
bined with CAPEX and OPEX (see Section 5.2) this can be used as support in selecting subsea
solutions with the lowest life cycle cost (Brandt and Eriksen, 2001).
The system is modeled with flow diagrams and reliability block diagrams. Then the software
generates random events with a specific probability distribution. Scheduled and conditional
events are also included. This simulates a lifetime scenario, when this is done enough times the
average will show an estimate of the actual lifetime. In Aven and Pedersen (2014) 20 000 simu-
lations were run to give negligible statistical estimation errors. Brandt and Eriksen (2001) state
that the output "will always be uncertain, and rely solidly on the quality of the reliability data." As
well Aven and Pedersen (2014) state that "production assurance analyses are based on the project
team’s knowledge at the time of the analysis. This knowledge is to a large extent reflected in the
assumptions made during the analysis." Knowledge on the system and quality data used right is
essential in achieving an applicable result.
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Aven and Pedersen (2014) address model uncertainties in a RAM analysis. In the article a
RAM analysis is conducted on a subsea production system as an example. It is suggested that an
importance score in two dimensions are contributed to each assumption made for an analysis.
The two dimensions are:
Sensitivity the effect changing the assumption has on the predicted production availability.
Uncertainty the level of uncertainty related to deviations for the assumptions made.
Aven and Pedersen (2014) use the importance score system on the assumptions for a subsea
production system RAM analysis. An assumption of three months mobilization time stands out
with both high sensitivity and uncertainty. Especially for subsea productions systems mobi-
lization time is very important for the availability in analyses. This enforces the focus on the
inherent reliability of the subsea components.
Drakeley et al. (2001) is an article where RAM analysis for the new technology of an intelli-
gent well is discussed. A methodology for establishing appropriate input data was presented. In
an analysis of new technology establishing appropriate input data is difficult. For new concepts
such as the DVXT this may be a problem. Most of it utilizes proven technology but the system
still requires data to be adapted. An important part of the method in Drakeley et al. (2001) is
uncertainty management. Several actions were taken to minimize the effect of data and model-
ing uncertainties. The actions were; sensitivity analysis, uncertainty distributions such as stan-
dard deviation, highly sensitive and uncertain components were closely followed up, thorough
review of models and input data, and application of expert judgments to calibrate data. The
analysis in Drakeley et al. (2001) suffered from the limited field experience of the new technol-
ogy; however, they still concluded that the analysis contributed to better design increasing the
reliability. This is important with regards to the DVXT, with good control of the uncertainties a
RAM analysis can still provide an adequate decision basis for choosing a XT configuration.
Lee et al. (2004) has conducted a RAM analysis on the subsea production system. In this
analysis the main equipment reducing system availability were found to be the SCM and the
wellhead connector. The SCM is expected to be a low reliability component and is therefore easy
to retrieve. The reason for the low reliability on the wellhead connector is not stated in the arti-
cle. This analysis concluded that the some configuration of the facilities needed to be changed
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and inspection intervals for maintenance were set to reach the availability goal of 99.0 %. The
goal was reached by adapting a 2 out of 3 system of the subsea wells to facilitate the further
system.
The finding of Lee et al. (2004) of the wellhead connector as one of the equipment reduc-
ing system reliability is somewhat surprising. Jardine (1986) state the wellhead connector to be
"highly reliable". In Table 3.1 the MTTF of the connector and wellhead is very high. The rea-
son for the unavailability caused by the wellhead connector may be explained by Jardine (1986)
which state that "it is necessary to look beyond the equipment’s unreliability and consider its fail-
ure impact, its method and time to repair, i.e. the equipment’s overall importance within its pro-
posed system environment." If the wellhead connector is damaged the well may be permanently
shut down or extensive repairs have to be conducted. This shows the importance of conducting
a RAM analysis, the inherent reliability is not enough to indicate the system reliability.
3.3 Reliability Data
Reliability data are required to accurately model and analyze a system. Molnes and Sundet
(1993) state that "the value of reliability data is time limited. It is therefore vital that operat-
ing companies have the capabilities required both in terms of manpower and software to collect
data on a continuous basis". This data can be used to improve the reliability of the equipment
installed and to later design reliable equipment.
For the Åsgard field, reliability data were used to choose a special durable choke valve to
meet the expected hard use on the field. The chosen choke valve appears to meet the require-
ments of the field proving that using reliability information adds value to a project (Østebø et al.,
2001).
3.3.1 Reliability Data Sources
Good reliability data is essential for a reliability analysis to be useful. There are several sources
of data in different industry sectors. For subsea developments Brandt and Eriksen (2001) state
that component reliability can be obtained from the following sources: general industry data
banks, vendor data, expert judgments, or synthesized data. In subsea oil and gas there are two
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Table 3.1: Main XT component reliability, derived from OREDA (2009) and SubseaMaster
(Molnes and Strand, 2007)
Item: SubseaMaster
MTTF (years):
OREDA MTTF (years)
All failures:
OREDA MTTF (years)
Critical failures:
Choke valve 14,9 6,7 107,4
Connector (XT) >552,0 308,5 713,5
Sensor/ indicator 169,7 12,7 178,4
Subsea control module 45,6 5,4 21,5
Valve w/actuator 168,6 207,6 207,6
Wellhead >543,1 326,2 439,1
main relevant industry data banks: the Offshore Reliability Database (OREDA) and WellMas-
ter/SubseaMaster.
"OREDA is a project organization sponsored by oil and gas companies with world-wide oper-
ations. OREDA’s main purpose is to collect and exchange reliability data among the participating
companies" (OREDA, 2009).
OREDA reliability data from a participating company is fully available to that one company.
Data from other companies are restricted. The OREDA handbooks are released publicly and
contain a lot of data on specific components. This data in the handbooks are rather old, the
2009 handbook contains data from years from 2000 to 2003. The data in Molnes and Strand
(2007) are collected from 2004 to 2007 and are therefore more up-to-date.
In OREDA (2009) there is reliability data on subsea XTs. OREDA has collected data from 208
VXTs and 62 HXTs. This is more than Molnes and Strand (2007), which contains reliability data
from 104 subsea wells.
SubseaMaster does not distinguish between critical, degraded, and incipient failures which
OREDA does. The data from OREDA is originally presented as failure rate per 106 hours. OREDA
also presents mean, lower, upper and standard deviation of the data to allow the reader to know
the uncertainty of the data. This is not included in the Molnes and Strand (2007) report, but may
be included in the SubseaMaster restricted database.
In Table 3.1 XT components reliability data from OREDA (2009) and Molnes and Strand
(2007) are compared. The components which were similarly described were included. The fail-
ure rate from OREDA has been calculated to MTTF. From the comparison much of the data co-
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incides. The largest differences are the sensor/ indicator and the SCM. Technology have made
great advances in the last decade, this could explain why the newer data show a considerably
better reliability.
3.3.2 Bottom-up Versus Top-down Approach
Combining data from the OREDA database and conventional reliability block diagrams often
result in a lower reliability than experienced in the field. GE Oil & Gas refers to this as a disparity
between bottom-up approach and top-down approach. This is further researched in Stende-
bakken (2014).
Bottom-up approach refers to reliability models that use specific XT component reliability
data in a reliability model for the whole XT system. The component data in the bottom-up
approach is taken from GE’s own database of components and data received from OREDA on
GE’s trees in service at the oil companies.
Top-down approach refers to high level reliability and availability experienced in the field.
The high level data is from the actual number of times trees are retrieved for service due to
failures.
The disparity may be related to how the failures are reported and classified in the reliability
database. If a failure is not a critical failure, this may not be noticed and may not require the
retrieval of the XT from the seabed. This requires the distinction between light intervention and
heavy workover in the database.
At the end of the bathtub curve (Figure 3.1) the failure rate increases. If some components
on the XT reach this part during the lifetime of the XT this may be a source of deviation in the
bottom-up model. The choke valve described in Section 2.2.2 is a component that has a high
wear. It may be assumed that the failure rate of the choke valve starts increasing during the
lifetime of the XT. To describe this with another probability distribution such as the Weibull
distribution can be more realistic; however, this is most likely not the main source of deviation
in the bottom-up approach.
The disparity between the approaches may be a result of inadequate models, but the most
likely cause is the reporting and classification of failures to the database. A possible cause of
error is when a VXT is retrieved due to a failure in the tubing. The normal procedure is then to
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overhaul the VXT, failures may then be found and classified as critical. However, the XT would
never have been retrieved because of this failure. Classification of failures and control of in what
setting failures are discovered is critical for achieving good data and models.
GE modifies their data based on experience so that the top-down and bottom-up approaches
correspond. On failures classified as critical, they sometimes use a Pareto rule that implies that
80% of the failures only lead to light intervention and 20% requires a heavy workover. This limits
the retrieval rate in the analysis and closes the gap between bottom-up and top-down.
GE has by this method removed some of the uncertainties of their system model for RAM
analysis. As previously stated from Drakeley et al. (2001) in Section 3.2.1; with good handling of
the uncertainties a good analysis can still be obtained. Especially expert judgments to calibrate
data can be used to close the gap between the bottom-up and top-down approach to achieve
realistic models.
Chapter 4
Qualitative Reliability Analysis of X-Mas
Tree Configurations
In this chapter a qualitative reliability analysis is conducted on the differences between the XT
configurations.
This analysis is a qualitative analysis of the reliability of the XT configurations compared to
each other. A literature survey has been conducted to identify reliability drivers that differentiate
the reliability of the XT configurations.
The analysis is not for a specific type of well, thus XTs are discussed in a broad setting. It is
not specific on water depth or if it is an oil or gas well. Only production wells are analyzed, not
injection wells. It is not differentiated between satellite, cluster, or template wells.
4.1 What to Assess
When discussing the different XT configurations it is important to assess the required functions
of a XT introduced in Section 2.1.
In Section 2.1.1 it is mentioned that the IDEF0 diagrams can be used as functional bound-
aries for an analysis. In an analysis comparing the reliability some functions are more important
that other. The function to stop flow on demand is important for the reliability of the tree, but
will not differentiate the reliability of the different types of XTs. This is because the valves are
basically the same on the different XT configurations.
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The functions of the different XT configurations are the same. Input, control and output
should also be the same. That leaves mechanism and how the mechanism affects the function as
the main differences. As previous stated the valves are the same on the different configurations.
This leaves the production bore, connectors, and swab valve/crown plug to be analyzed.
An important function of the well is to be able to retrieve the production tubing. This is not
a direct function of the VXT; however, it is for the HXT. Functions like this that are affected by
the XT should also be considered in an analysis.
Redundancy is an important aspect of system reliability. However, the relevant systems dif-
ferentiating the XT configurations do not have redundancy, thus it is not relevant. Jardine (1986)
state that "in deep water, the advantages of redundancy will diminish and the philosophy of sim-
plicity in design will prevail". This analysis do not differentiate between deepwater and shallow
water application of the XTs. Simplicity in design is still a philosophy worth keeping in mind
during the analysis because of the positive impact it has on reliability.
This section aims to identify the reliability drivers that will differentiate the configurations
in a system reliability analysis.
4.1.1 Maintainability
"Statistically, most workover interventions on subsea trees are due to downhole problems rather
than problems with the tree" (Richbourg and Winter, 1998). On the other hand Molnes and
Sundet (1993) state that gas/condensate producing wells has a "history of relatively few failures
and corresponding high tubing reliability". This is a big driver of the system reliability and one
of the main factors when deciding the XT configuration of a well.
The downhole problems of an oil well can be contributed to different characteristics of the
oil. Characteristics such as sand content, water cut, scale, and H2S content are some factors that
may affect the reliability of the tubing. The concentration of these characteristics compared to
tubing failures are not assessed by Molnes and Sundet (1993).
Aven and Pedersen (2014) state that for a subsea production system "the active repair times
are short compared with the mobilization time, and can be ignored". This implies that the only
important factor for a XT is the inherent reliability, if every failure requires the same type of ves-
sel to be mobilized. As far as the author has understood there is no difference in the types of
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vessel required to perform maintenance on the different XT configurations. But it may cause a
significant difference of the active repair when the XT has to be retrieved as well. Aven and Ped-
ersen (2014) may not have included extra lifting operations into the statement, just the actual
repair of a component.
How maintainable the XT and the well system are is an important contributor towards the
system reliability. This is also a key difference between the XT configurations so maintainability
should be a focus point of the reliability analysis.
4.1.2 Leak Paths
The function to direct flow is the first function of the XT function block diagram shown in Fig-
ure 2.2. Without this function the next functions will fail. The most important functional re-
quirement to this function is to direct flow without leakage to the surroundings.
The main focus of well integrity (see Appendix B) is well barriers. The XT is a part of the
secondary well barrier in a producing well (NORSOK D-010). This means that a failure in the
XT alone will not lead to a blowout. A leakage may still lead to some fluids released to the en-
vironment. This would also lead to stop in production from the well for some time until the XT
is replaced. This is because "upon confirmation of loss of the primary or secondary well barrier,
the well shall be shut-in and the remaining well barrier verified. Only activities related to the
re-establishment of the well barrier shall be carried out on the effected well" (NORSOK D-010).
ISO 13628-4 state that "the number of potential leak paths should be minimized during sys-
tem design". More leak paths may lead an unacceptable level of safety, a higher probability of
leakage, and a lower system reliability.
The parts of a XT that has the potential of being a direct leak path to the surrounding are the
connectors, wellhead, and XT block. The XT configurations have different number of connec-
tors, forces on wellhead, and design of the bore. This should be looked into in a comparison.
4.1.3 Flow Control Module
As mentioned in Section 2.2.6 the choke valve and some sensors may be put into a retrievable
FCM. This will improve the maintainability of those parts. However, this makes the system more
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complex and adds potential leak paths. This may impair the reliability and safety of the tree. The
need for a FCM may be different for the different XT configurations and should be discussed in
the analysis.
4.2 Vertical X-Mas Tree
In Table 4.1 the HXT has over twice the MTTF of the VXT. This may relate to that VXTs were more
frequently used before and newer wells more frequently have HXTs. They also may have newer
more reliable technology, the older VXTs may lower the MTTF and a new VXT may have a higher
MTTF. It is difficult to discuss this further without improved knowledge on the data collected.
4.2.1 Maintainability
The VXT is easier to replace than a HXT because the tubing hanger is hung in the wellhead.
If the tubing is going to be replaced a VXT provides a more comprehensive procedure with
more operations. Disconnecting the jumper and the umbilical has to be done first, then the tree
can be removed and eventually the BOP can be put on the wellhead and the tubing hanger and
tubing retrieved. This is the reason that a well that is expected to have downhole problems is
equipped with a HXT and vice versa. "A HXT is not recommended for use in a gas field because
interventions are rarely needed" (Bai and Bai, 2012). Retrieving the tubing from well with a HXT
is a simpler and less time consuming procedure. What kind of maintenance that is expected in
a well and XT is therefore key in the maintainability of the system. This favors one configuration
over the other in a maintainability perspective depending on the well.
Table 4.1: XT configuration reliability (derived from OREDA, 2009)
Item: No of
units:
MTTF
(years)
All
failures:
MTTF
(years)
Critical
failures:
Active repair
time (hours),
all failures:
Active repair
time (hours),
critical failures:
VXT 208 8,5 46,0 26,6 25,0
HXT 62 22,9 116,5 140,0 240,0
VXT Wellhead 199 292,7 407,7 288,0 288,0
HXT Wellhead 62 193,5 207,6 - -
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In shallow waters the time used to retrieve a XT is much shorter than in deep water. When
retrieving the tubing from shallow water the extra time used to pull a VXT may be negligible.
The swab valve of the VXT allows shorter time spent with wireline operations. It is faster to
open the swab valve than to retrieve the crown plug of a HXT in the preparation of a wireline
operation; however, this time is very short and negligible.
4.2.2 Leak Paths
The VXT has a swab valve compared to the HXT which has a crown plug. As seen in Table 2.1
a valve (MTTF of 168,6 years) has a lower MTTF than a XT plug (MTTF of 225,8 years). The XT
plug is assumed to be the crown plug of a HXT.
The two plug failures were both failure to disconnect. The valve failures vary more but the
main contributors were spurious operation and failure to close (Molnes and Strand, 2007).
A valve instead of a plug is therefore a slightly worse option with regards to reliability and
leak paths due to the nature of the failures.
4.2.3 Flow Control Module
Since it easier to retrieve a VXT it may be available for repair on a rig or sent to the manufacturer
for an overhaul, temporarily replaced by a backup XT. Replacing or repairing the choke valve or
a sensor on this occasion may remove the need for pulling the tree because of the choke valve
or the need for replacing this subsea.
A VXT without a FCM would not have the negative effect of the FCM on safety and still have
good maintainability of the choke valve and sensors.
4.3 Horizontal X-Mas Tree
4.3.1 Maintainability
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1 a key difference between a VXT and a HXT is how easy it is to
retrieve the tubing. Bai and Bai (2012) state that "an HXT is applied in complex reservoirs or
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those needing frequent workovers that require tubing retrieval, whereas a VXT is often chosen for
simple reservoirs or when the frequency of tubing retrieval workover is low".
Table 4.1 show a considerably worse repair time for the HXT. This relates to the extra time
spent retrieving the tubing before retrieving the HXT.
4.3.2 Leak Paths
All of the XT configurations use a BOP during retrieval of the tubing. The HXT has the BOP
mounted on top of it compared to the VXT where the tree is retrieved first and the BOP is con-
nected to the wellhead. When the BOP is on top of the HXT it adds height to the already high
BOP stack. This increases the moment force on the wellhead. "Bending loads at the flex joint are
a function of the riser bottom tension and the riser bottom angle. These loads can result in large
bending moments at the wellhead due to the moment arm arising from the BOP stack height."
(Golan and Sangesland, 1993). With the increased height from the HXT the strength of the well-
head and connector may be a problem.
As previously discussed in Section 3.2.1, Lee et al. (2004) found the wellhead as a component
reducing availability. The wellhead is critical for the wells integrity and replacing a damaged
wellhead is not possible requiring a new costly well to be drilled. This is shown in the extensive
repair time of the wellhead in Table 4.1.
According to Holand (1997) tripping out is one of the top three most dangerous activities for
a well, retrieval of the tubing is therefore a dangerous activity. This raises the question of which
XT configuration has the safest setup during retrieval of the tubing. The HXT setup with the BOP
on top of the HXT makes this solution more vulnerable.
As seen in Table 4.1 the HXT wellhead has a considerably lower MTTF than the VXT. The
low MTTF of the HXT wellhead may be related to the low number of units recorded. No failures
were recorded as well, how the failure rate then was calculated is uncertain. If the MTTFs are
assumed to be correct, the level of availability and safety may be considerably lower than of the
VXT.
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4.3.3 Flow Control Module
On a HXT the cost of pulling the tree is high, this imply that a FCM is the best choice with re-
gards to maintainability. However, this may impair the safety of the HXT with the addition of
complexity and leak paths.
4.4 Deepwater Vertical X-Mas Tree
4.4.1 Maintainability
The DVXT is more maintainable than the VXT. Because of the piping spool on the THS the
jumper is not disconnected when retrieving the tree. The annulus isolation valve also is ben-
eficial as a secondary barrier of the annulus during XT retrieval because it eliminates the need
for a temporary barrier in the annulus. The DVXT is therefore more maintainable for both tree
and tubing problems than the VXT. However, the HXT still has an advantage when over the DVXT
on tubing retrieval.
4.4.2 Leak Paths
The DVXT is a more complicated XT than the other configurations. Extra connections are made
subsea; the THS to wellhead and the XT to the flow spool on the THS. Connections are a vul-
nerable part with regards to leak paths. As seen in Table 2.1 the connectors are a very reliable
component; however, the infant mortality is not assessed.
If the connector fails during installation it has a high chance of being discovered. If a con-
nector is damaged this would require the connector to be replaced or the whole tree replaced.
This would cost a lot of money and installation time. The infant mortality in the burn-in period
is not found to be a problem but may be so. Many connector that is supposed to connect at the
same time make installation difficult and more tedious since more time is spent overseeing and
testing. When the connection is made and the XT put in service the low failure rate means that
in service the extra number of connectors are not a problem for the availability.
CHAPTER 4. QUALITATIVE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF X-MAS TREE CONFIGURATIONS 36
4.4.3 Flow Control Module
The cost of pulling a DVXT is the lowest of the three configurations, this may eliminate need for
a FCM from a maintainability perspective.
Chapter 5
Qualitative Comparison of X-Mas Tree
Configurations
This chapter highlights other factors than reliability that are important during the selection of
XT configuration.
5.1 OneSubsea Tree Selector Tool
To help their customers, the XT provider OneSubsea has made a tree selector tool available on
their web page (OneSubsea, 2015). The OneSubsea Tree Selector Tool (TST) is fully available to
their customers, but only a simple version that is available to the public is used in this thesis.
The TST uses ten categories listed in Table 5.1. In each category a slider is placed to rank the
importance of that category to the customer. The importance is rated from none to critical. The
result is given in a percentage on how each tree suits the customer’s ranking of the importance
of the categories.
With every category rated to middle criticality a baseline is established. Changing one cate-
gory at a time gave an indication on how each category affected what the result, this is shown in
Table 5.1.
OneSubsea has three types of XTs that are ranked in the result. A VXT, a HXT and a vertical
monobore subsea tree that looks similar to GE’s DVXT. In the description of OneSubsea’s tree
they mention a tubing spool that lets the annulus bypass the monobore tubing hanger. The
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Table 5.1: OneSubsea tree selector tool, favored type of XT if category is critical = X (derived from
OneSubsea, 2015)
No: Category: VXT: DVXT: HXT:
1 CAPEX costs - - X
2 OPEX costs X X -
3 Availability of installation tooling - - X
4 Tree size and weight - - X
5 Safety barriers in installation - - X
6 Safety barriers in intervention - - X
7 Light-well intervention flexibility X X -
8 Downhole communication fault during installation - X -
9 Ease of access to tubing X X -
10 Ease of access to tree - - X
author has used this information to state that OneSubsea’s vertical monobore subsea tree and
the DVXT from GE are similar and can be treated as the same.
5.2 Cost
Cost is another factor that influences the choice of XT configuration. Costs are divided into two
categories:
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) is the total amount of investment necessary to put a project into
operation and includes the cost of initial design, engineering, construction, and installa-
tion (Bai and Bai, 2012).
Operating Expenditure (OPEX) is the expenses incurred during the normal operation of a fa-
cility, or component after the installation, including labor, material, utilities, and other
related expenses. OPEX contains operational costs, maintenance costs, testing costs, and
other related costs (Bai and Bai, 2012).
Bai and Bai (2012) state that "the cost of an HXT is much higher than that of a VXT; typically the
purchase price of an HXT is five to seven times more". This contradicts the OneSubsea (2015)
TST, there it is stated that the VXT and DVXT involves the most CAPEX, as seen in Table 5.1. The
main contributing factor of this is the tolling and riser investments. This view is confirmed by
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Norwegian Oil & Gas (2012) which state that during installation "a HXT reduces the amount of
equipment needed, time, and cost".
The DVXT this is a more complex tree with more parts than a VXT. The expensive special
dual bore riser that a VXT requires is not necessary for a DVXT. The total CAPEX is not public,
but it can be assumed that the tree itself is more expensive than the VXT. It can also be assumed
that the tooling investments for a DVXT are much lower than a VXT, similar to a HXT.
The OneSubsea (2015) TST favors the VXT and DVXT if OPEX is critical. This is because of
the cost from wireline plug installation or removal on a HXT. On the other hand the HXT has
much lower cost from retrieving the tubing. The OPEX is therefore entirely dependent on what
type of failures that are expected in the well.
The DVXT may have a lower OPEX than the VXT because of the THS. The THS lowers the
amount of operations required during tubing retrieval.
Both the CAPEX and the OPEX is dependent on the variable factors in the subsea production
system. The HXT has the lowest CAPEX, but if the required riser and tooling already are available
the VXT can be favored. The OPEX depends on what type of interventions is expected in the well.
The OPEX discusses is only the cost associated with the tree and operation itself. The cost
of unavailability of the production is also a large contributor. However, this is covered in the
reliability analysis.

Chapter 6
Evaluation of X-Mas Tree Configurations
The selection process of a XT configuration is complex with many uncertainties. A good selec-
tion requires detailed expert knowledge of the production field being developed and the avail-
able configurations.
The selection seems obvious with the statements from Bai and Bai (2012) (see Section 4.2.1),
recommending a VXT for a gas well and a HXT for an oil well. However, the introduction of a
more complex tree that incorporate other benefits, make the selection more difficult. In addi-
tion for shallow water the advantages of the HXT on tubing retrieval may be negligible and the
VXT the best choice even for oil wells.
A key point in the selection process is good data. Good data combined with a RAM analysis
form a good foundation for the selection. Good knowledge of the subsea production system and
the oil/gas field is also important in establishing a realistic model to support the decision.
Molnes and Strand (2007) found that the choke valve and the SCM were the main XT compo-
nents to fail. Both these components are the same and independent of the different XT config-
urations. The low reliability of those components is solved through them being easy to retrieve
and replace with a smaller intervention vessel.
Lee et al. (2004) (see Section 3.2.1) had through a RAM analysis found the main components
to lower availability to be the wellhead and SCM. In choosing between the configurations there
is no influence on the SCM.
The interesting part from Lee et al. (2004) is the finding of the wellhead connector as a com-
ponent reducing system availability. This could have an impact on the selection of XT configu-
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rations. As stated in Section 4.3.2 the HXT may have a higher strain on the wellhead connector
than the other XT configurations due to the combined height of the HXT and BOP during inter-
ventions. This phase is also critical since in would often imply that the dangerous procedure of
tripping out tubing is being conducted.
The DVXT may seem like a good choice despite of the well type. It induces less strain on the
wellhead compared to the HXT and is more maintainable than the VXT. The main problem with
the DVXT can be the increased installation time due to the extra number of connectors. The
DVXT is also a more complex system; simplicity in design increases the reliability and the DVXT
may therefore have worse inherent reliability than the VXT and HXT. This may be overcome with
the technology advances and the increased maintainability of the DVXT.
The author recommends that the end result of the decision process is made on the basis of
a RAM analysis. For wells where many or few tubing interventions are expected a RAM analysis
may not be necessary. In all other wells a RAM analysis should be conducted. Then proba-
bly the DVXT or other monobore XTs would more often be the best choice. This should not be
unexpected since these XTs are the new generation and is being developed to give better perfor-
mance.
Chapter 7
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
The focus of this thesis is to provide input for choosing the optimal XT configuration for a subsea
production system.
Throughout this thesis many different aspects of XTs are described and discussed through
literature studies. This is the first objective of this thesis.
The second objective in this thesis is to describe the main functions, components and the
reliability of those components. The functions are described in Section 2.1, they are also mod-
eled as functional block diagrams in Section 2.1.1. The subsea XT is used to direct, regulate, and
stop the flow from or to a well.
The main components and their reliability are described in Section 2.2. The functions of a
XT are achieved through several valves, mainly the production master valve, wing valve and the
choke valve. Other main components of the XT are the SCM and sensors.
The choke valve has the worst inherent reliability of the components on a XT. Because of this
the choke valve is designed for easy retrieval. The choke valve could also be placed in a separate
module together with some of the sensors. These are the sensors that are expected to require
replacement either due to failures or the changing characteristics of the well. This module is
called a FCM and is placed on the XT and easy to retrieve by a small intervention vessel. The
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SCM is the XT component with the second worst reliability. Similar to the FCM, the SCM is
a module that is easy to retrieve and replace. Modularization is a good method of improving
system maintenance of unreliable components.
Objective three is to describe the different XT configurations and how they affect the relia-
bility of the subsea production system. The configurations are described in Section 2.3. There
are two main configurations which are the VXT and the HXT. A third configuration is also de-
scribed; the DVXT is a modified version of the VXT. The main differences are how the main
valves are placed and how the tubing with tubing hanger is installed. The DVXT is different from
the VXT because of the THS. The THS is installed on the wellhead, and then the tubing hanger
is installed and hung in the THS. The DVXT can then be installed on top of the THS in the same
way a VXT would be installed on the wellhead.
Objective four is to evaluate the reliability data and models that are used to assess the relia-
bility of a subsea XT, this is done in Chapter 3.
MTTF is the most used performance indicator of subsea reliability. The exponential distribu-
tion is the most frequently used model of a subsea components lifetime. This assumes constant
failure rate during the useful life period of a component, then the failure rate is constant propor-
tional with the MTTF. It is important to note that the "MTTF is merely a performance indicator,
not a lifetime prediction figure" (Molnes and Sundet, 1993).
The subsea production system is maintainable; the main reliability measure is then the avail-
ability. The availability consists of the inherent reliability, maintainability, recoverability, and the
maintenance support performance.
A good and frequently used method to analyze the availability of a subsea production sys-
tem is through RAM analysis software. It uses reliability block diagrams, flow diagrams, and
Monte Carlos next event simulation to simulate the lifetime and the availability of the subsea
production system.
RAM analysis is dependent on quality reliability data and expert knowledge on the system
to give a usable output. The sensitivity and uncertainty of assumptions should be considered.
Lesser quality data may still be useful if used correctly and the uncertainties are managed.
In a RAM analysis the inherent reliability is just one piece of the puzzle. The failure impact
is just as important. The wellhead connector is an example of this; it has high reliability, but will
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have a large impact on the availability of the well if it is damaged.
Two main sources of reliability data for subsea components are OREDA (2009) and Molnes
and Strand (2007). There is some disparity between the two data sources. This could relate to
how, from when, or from where the data are collected.
When applying component reliability data in a RAM analysis, this often give a lower avail-
ability than experienced in real life. This most likely relates to the same problems experienced
in the disparity between the different reliability data sources.
A RAM analysis may still prove useful if these problems are handled correctly. Expert judg-
ment can be used to calibrate the data so that the model fit the real life scenario. The model and
analysis can then be used to optimize the reliability of the design.
OREDA (2009) distinguishes between data collected from wells with a HXT and VXT. A lower
MTTF is recorded for the VXT, this may relate to older generation VXTs installed. Understanding
the quality of the data is difficult and decisions should not be taken solely on the basis of data
straight form the OREDA handbook.
Objective five is a reliability assessment on the differences between the XT configurations.
An assessment consists of an analysis and an evaluation. A qualitative analysis is done in Chap-
ter 4 and the evaluation is conducted in Chapter 6.
A key difference between the XT configurations is the maintainability of the tree and the
tubing. Wells that is expected to have many tubing failures should be equipped with a HXT and
a VXT should be on a well with few tubing failures. This is mainly due to the order of which the
components are installed as the HXT allows the tubing to be retrieved without retrieving the tree
and vice versa for the VXT.
A failure on the wellhead connector will have a large impact on the availability. Interventions
on the HXT are done with a BOP on top of the HXT. The height of both these components puts
more strain on the wellhead than the other XT configurations. Tripping out tubing is one of the
more dangerous operations in a well; this combined with the extra strain on the wellhead may
cause bad consequences. This may give an advantage for the VXT in a risk perspective.
A XT with a FCM will have improved maintainability. The FCM adds leak paths and makes
the design more complex. The HXT is the configuration that would benefit the most of a FCM.
The VXT and DVXT are easier to retrieve and may have the benefit of a simpler design without
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the FCM.
The DVXT is more maintainable than the VXT and does not have the challenges of the HXT
with the wellhead. This configuration may be a good choice of configuration for wells with a
medium amount of tubing failures. The DVXT is more complex and has more leak paths than
the other two configurations. The DVXT may have a higher infant mortality because of this.
Objective 6 is to describe and evaluate what should be assessed when selecting a XT con-
figuration for a new subsea well. Some factors that should be considered are described and
discussed in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4. Some non-reliability factors are described in
Chapter 5.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, Drakeley et al. (2001) suffered from limited field experience
of new technology. Drakeley et al. (2001) concluded that if data and model uncertainties are
handled a RAM analysis may still contribute to better design and reliability.
The expected failure rate of the tubing, the failure rate of the wellhead with different XT
configuration, and whether to have a FCM or not are important reliability drivers that can be
analyzed in RAM analysis software.
CAPEX and OPEX are also important factors in the decision process. The overall life cycle
cost is difficult to estimate. One result from the RAM analysis is the OPEX cost; this could easily
be combined with CAPEX to find optimal XT configuration from a cost perspective.
OneSubsea (2015) help their customers choose XT configuration with a TST. This gives a
basic indication of which configuration to choose for a well.
A RAM analysis would give an overall look on the reliability and life cycle cost of the subsea
production system. RAM analysis software is able to process the many varying factors that im-
pact the optimal XT configuration for a subsea production system and should be the foundation
of the decision process.
7.2 Discussion
The diversity of factors involved in subsea production systems make a general statement on
the optimal XT configuration hard to formulate. In some parts of the industry the factors of
configurations selection is well known. As stated in the Limitations (Section 1.3), the limited
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open research and data available are a limitation for this kind of research and has limited the
result of this thesis.
7.3 Recommendations for Further Work
The next step after this thesis may be to conduct a quantitative RAM analysis using software
described in Section 3.2.1. It should investigate the impact of tubing failure on the cost and
availability of a subsea well with different XT configurations. A finding may be an intersection
between tubing failure rate and the optimal XT configurations. A base case scenario of a sub-
sea production system should be established. Then three different setups with the three XT
configurations should be established. The failure rate of the tubing can then be adjusted. The
availability and cost could then be assessed as the tubing failure rate is adjusted.
Another topic of further research can be the effect that a HXT and BOP has on the wellhead.
As discussed in Section 4.3.2 the failure rate of a wellhead with a HXT may have a lower level of
availability and safety than a VXT. This could be researched further, a thorough review of failure
data and loads on the wellhead is recommended. The focus could be on wellheads and the
different XT configurations that are installed on them. A deeper look into more detailed OREDA
data may provide some results on this topic.

Appendix A
Acronyms
BOP blowout preventer
CAPEX capital expenditures
TST tree selector tool
DVXT deepwater vertical x-mas tree
FCM flow control module
GE General Electric
HXT horizontal x-mas tree
IDEF0 integration definition 0
MTTF mean time to failure
OPEX operating expenditure
OREDA offshore reliability database
PMV production master valve
PWV production wing valve
RAM reliability, availability, and maintainability
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RAMS reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
SCM subsea control module
THS tubing head spool
VXT vertical x-mas tree
XT x-mas tree
Appendix B
Definitions
Blowout an uncontrolled flow of fluids from a wellhead or wellbore (Holand, 1997).
Conductor housing is the top of the casing conductor, the casing conductor is installed through
the temporary guide base, either by piling or drilling, and provides an installation point
for the permanent guide base and a landing area for the wellhead housing (Bai and Bai,
2012).
Jumper a short pipe connector that is used to transport production fluid between two subsea
components, for example, a tree and a manifold (Bai and Bai, 2012).
Lower marine riser package a device similar to a small BOP attached to the tree mandrel used
for emergency well control and riser disconnect when running, retrieving or working over
a dual bore tree (Richbourg and Winter, 1998).
Manifold an arrangement of piping and/or valves designed to combine, distribute, control, and
often monitor fluid flow (Bai and Bai, 2012).
Permanent guide base is installed on the conductor housing, establishes structural support
and final alignment for the wellhead system. The permanent guide base provides guid-
ance and support for running the BOP stack or the subsea tree (Bai and Bai, 2012).
Production tubing the tubing through which the production fluids are delivered from the reser-
voir to the production tree (Richbourg and Winter, 1998).
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Tubing see production tubing.
Tubing hanger a component of the wellhead system for supporting the production tubing in
the well (Richbourg and Winter, 1998).
Well barrier envelope of one or several well barrier elements preventing fluids from flowing
unintentionally from the formation into the wellbore, into another formation, or to the
external environment (NORSOK D-010, 2013).
Well integrity application of technical, operational and organizational solutions to reduce risk
of uncontrolled release of formation fluids and well fluids throughout the life cycle of a
well (NORSOK D-010).
Wellhead a structural and pressure-containing anchoring point on the seabed for the drilling,
casing strings, and completion systems (Bai and Bai, 2012).
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